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CYBER-BULLYING: OBSTACLES AND SOLUTIONS FOR TEACHERS AND
ADMINISTRATORS TO STOP CYBER-BULLYING
Seth Greenspan
“Never be bullied into silence. Never allow yourself to be made a victim. Accept no
one’s definition of your life, but define yourself.”
–Harvey S. Firestone
INTRODUCTION
Donnie, an 8-year-old girl, was switched from a private to a public school.
That switch changed her life forever. Donnie was bullied extensively for the first 2
days and by her own account stated, “the first 2 days were the worst of her life.”1
While standing in line in the cafeteria two boys continued bullying her. She wanted
to defend herself but knew it was wrong. However, she could not stand it anymore
so she took matters into her own hands. She pushed one of the boys and kicked the
other. She was sent to the principal’s office and disciplined for her retaliation. But
what are the consequences for the bullies? Can the public school suspend and/or
discipline the bullies? Of course, there is no question that public schools are well
within their rights to discipline the bullies for actions that occur on school campus.2
On the other hand, Teresa, a junior high public school student is being
tormented and bullied constantly in school. Teresa is too shy to speak up and not as
brave as Donnie to lash out against the bullies. Teresa longs for each and every
school day to be over, to return to the comfort of her own home. She returns home

Pacer’s National Bullying Prevention Center, Stories, available at
http://www.pacer.org/bullying/stories/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2012).
2 Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979). The court explained:
Our willingness to grant school officials substantial autonomy within their academic domain rests in
part on the confinement of that power within the metes and bounds of the school itself.
1

to find that the bullying persists – she is also being cyber-bullied.3 Do the
administrators and educators at the public school have any recourse against the
cyber-bullies (assuming they are students at the school)? What legal actions can be
taken against Teresa’s abusers?
Cyber-bullying is a relatively new semblance of bullying that has emerged
over the past two decades. Cyber-bullying is so widespread that it has become the
bullying method of choice.4 The evolution and expansion of the Internet and online
communities such as YouTube, Gchat, Facebook etc., has given bullies access to even
more avenues to bully their peers. No longer do we live in a world where children
and adolescents are merely bullied in schoolyards or in classroom settings. The
home in no longer a safe haven. Bullying is all around us.
Cyber-bullies typically hide behind the mask of anonymity.5 They may lack
face-to-face contact with the individuals being persecuted and they may not know
the level of duress that is produced by their misconduct. Therefore, they are unlikely
to experience feelings of regret, sympathy, or compassion toward the victim as some
face-to-face bullies potentially feel. Thus, there is an even bigger to combat cyberbullying and the best place to start is at school.

Pacer’s National Bullying Prevention Center, Stories, available at
http://www.pacer.org/bullying/stories/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2012).
4 Puresight Online Safety, The Dangers of Cyberbullying, available at
http://puresight.com/Cyberbullying/the-dangers-of-cyber-bullying.html (last visited Dec. 12,2012).
5 Education Resources Information Center, When Teens Turn Cyberbullies, availabel at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/search/detailmini.jsp?_nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearch_Searc
hValue_0=EJ741205&ERICExtSearch_SearchType_0=no&accno=EJ741205 (last visited Dec. 12,2012).
3

Cyber-bullying is a devastating challenge which all public schools face.6
“Nearly one in three teens say they've been victimized via the Internet or cell
phones.”7 A school is a place where children are educated, learn life lessons and
should feel comfortable attending. Although cyber-bullying happens both on school
grounds and outside schools grounds, “a teacher's role - or a school's role - is still
fuzzy in many places. What legal rights or responsibilities do they have to silence
bullies, especially when they operate from home?”8 Schools want to help combat
cyber-bullying9 but often the policies, if enacted, are too vague and schools are not
properly guide.

10

Schools need to be aware of their legal rights and

responsibilities.11
This paper will discuss the differences between traditional bullying and
cyber-bullying, and the corresponding statutes states have begun to enact to combat
bullying. Secondly, this paper will discuss the constitutional issues posed to public
schools in adopting a cyber-bullying policy, namely First Amendment and Due
Process issues. In conjunction with the constitutional issues, the paper will address
policy issues in enacting a cyber-bullying policy, and will propose model cyberbullying provisions to be included in a policy for public schools.

Mary Ellen Flannery, Top Eight Challenges Teachers Face This School Year, available at
http://neatoday.org/2010/09/13/top-eight-challenges-teachers-face-this-school-year (last visited
Dec. 12, 2012).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools Into the Fray, N.Y. Times, June 27, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/style/28bully.html?_
r=1&sq=hoffman&st=cse&scp=3&pagewanted=all. The author notes:
Many principals hesitate to act because school discipline codes or state laws do not define
cyberbullying.
10 Cdnogen, Research Post: School Officials Handle Cyber Bullying, StudentWebStuff.com,
http://www.studentwebstuff.com/mis/showthread.php?t=8123 (last visited, Dec. 12, 2012).
11 Id.
6

I. CYBER-BULLYING: CURRENT ISSUES AND STATUTES
“Cyber-bullying is the willful and repeated use of cell phones, computers, and
other electronic communication devices to harass and threaten others. Instant
messaging, chat rooms, e-mails, and messages posted on websites are the most
common methods of this new twist of bullying. Cyber-bullies can quickly spread
messages and images to a vast audience, while remaining anonymous, often making
them difficult to trace.”12 Cyber-bullying has a detrimental impact on lives of
children and adolescents. Students being cyber-bullied report feeling depressed,
angry, sad, and frustrated.13 On a more extreme note, cyber-bullied students report
of having suicidal thoughts.14 Many students who are cyber-bullied within the
comforts of their own homes are afraid or embarrassed to go back to school.
There are vast differences between cyber-bullying and traditional bullying.
Besides for their differences, cyber bullying is even more devastating for a number
of reasons. First, cyber-bullying offenders remain anonymous. “The cyber-bully can
cloak his or her identity behind a computer or cell phone using anonymous email
addresses or pseudonymous screen names.”15 This ‘mask’ does not allow for the
bullies to see the harm and emotional distress they are causing. Second, cyberbullying is viral – large numbers of people can be involved and the harm is even
more widespread. For example, Tyler Clementi, a Rutgers University student was

National Conference of State Legislatures, Cyberbullying, available at http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/educ/cyberbullying.aspx (last visited, Dec. 12, 2012).
13 Cyberbullying: Identification, Prevention, and Response, Sameer Hinduja, Ph.D. and Justin W.
Patchin, Ph.D., page 1
14 Cyberbullying Research Summary: Cyberbullying and Suicide, Sameer Hinduja, Ph.D. and Justin W.
Patchin, Ph.D.
15 Cyberbullying: Identification, Prevention, and Response, Sameer Hinduja, Ph.D. and Justin W.
Patchin, Ph.D., page 2
12

taped while engaged in a consensual sexual encounter with another man is his dorm
room.16 Dharun Ravi, Tyler’s roommate and person responsible for taping the
encounter, invited others to watch and discuss what he saw online. The video went
viral which soon thereafter led to Tyler committing suicide.17 Lastly, children and
adolescents are more technically savvy than their adult counterparts and while
parents and teachers are doing their jobs preventing traditional bullying, they lack
the technological knowhow to keep track of what teens are doing online.18
Given the differences between traditional bullying and cyber-bullying, the
current anti-bullying statutes that have been enacted amongst the States are lacking.
Although Montana is the only state yet to enact an anti-bullying law19, laws enacted
by the others states do not adequately provide teachers and administrators
guidance on how to enforce and regulate. Further, of the states that have enacted
anti-bullying laws, many of them are only geared towards traditional bullying and
do not address cyber-bullying.20
New York’s anti-bullying law reads:
Such comprehensive district-wide safety plan shall be developed by
the district-wide school safety team and shall include at a minimum:
j. Strategies for improving communication among students and
between students and staff and reporting of potentially violent
incidents, such as the establishment of youth-run programs, peer
mediation, conflict resolution, creating a forum or designating a

16 Ashley Hayes, Prosecutor to appeal 30-day sentence in Rutgers gay bullying casr, CNN, May 21,
2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/21/justice/new-jersey-rutgers-sentencing/index.html
17 Linsey Davis & Emily Friedman, NJ Gov. Wonders How Rutgers ‘Spies' Can Sleep at Night After
Clementi's Suicide, ABC News (Sept. 30, 2010), http:// abcnews.go.com/US/suicide-rutgersuniversity-freshman-tyler-clementi-stuns-veteran/story?id=11763784.
18 Id.
19 Infra Figure 1
20 Id.

mentor for students concerned with bullying or violence and
establishing anonymous reporting mechanisms for school violence.21
The pertinent information to take away from this enacted law is that New
York’s anti-bullying statute fails to mention cyber-bullying or electronic harassment
– which encompasses cyber-bullying. To combat the problem, the problem must
first be addressed. We see from here that statutes such as New Yorks are lacking
and must be changed.
Comparing New York’s statute with that of New Jersey’s, a more
comprehensive and encompassing statute, which reads:
a. A school district's policy on prohibiting harassment, intimidation or
bullying shall be amended, if necessary, to reflect the provisions of
“Electronic communication.”
b. In the event that a school district's policy on prohibiting
harassment, intimidation or bullying does not accord with the
provisions of subsection A, the district's existing policy prohibiting
harassment, intimidation or bullying shall be deemed to include an
“electronic communication” as defined.22
We see from here that New Jersey has taken the appropriate steps to halt
cyber-bullying, but having the statute is not the end all and be all.
Many state anti-bullying statutes direct state educational agencies to, among
other things: report on incidents of bullying, provide training, develop curriculum
and standards for training, and develop teacher preparation program standards on
identification and prevention.23 While a statute requiring schools to enact policies to
combat and prevent electronic communication and/or cyber-bullying, that is not

New York N.Y. Educ. Law § 2801-a (McKinney 2009)
New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 18A:37-13, -15 (West 2011)
23State Educational Agency: Model Anti-Bullying Policies and Other Resources, July 2011
21
22

sufficient. There is also a need for a model policy that schools can follow.24 In light of
the usefulness of a model, only a number of the states that have enacted antibullying statutes have also drafted a model policy for schools to follow.25 This
exacerbates and compounds the problem.
Although extremely helpful, having a model policy is not the ultimate means
to the end. The policy must be comprehensive and inclusive. The ten states that have
model policies fail to give schools proper guidance on how to deal with cyberbullying. Some states fail to mention cyber-bullying or electronic communication in
their policies.26 Even the states that have created model policies including cyberbullying and electronic communication,27 leave teachers and administrators up in
the air as how to apply the definition as to not potentially create First Amendment
issues. Hence, while model policies have been drafted and more and more states
have enacted statutes to combat cyber-bullying, the question still remains: how can
public school officials legally implement policies to deal with cyber-bullying without
violating First Amendment and Due Process rights of students?
II. FIRST AMENDMENT AND DUE PROCESS ISSUES IN CYBER-BULLYING
POLICIES
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
State Educational Agency: Model Anti-Bullying Policies and Other Resources, July 2011
These states include California, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Oklahoma, Nebraska, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Washington
26 Sample Policy for Bullying Prevention, Cal. Dep't of Educ., available at
http://www.cde.ca.gov/ls/ss/se/samplepolicy.asp (last updated July. 3, 2012);
27 Deleware’s Model Bully Prevention Policy, www.doe.k12.de.us/.../bully%20prevention%20policy
%20template.pdf
24
25

assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.28
In order to adopt a model cyber-bullying policy, First Amendment issues
must be at the forefront of drafter’s minds and pens. It has long been held that
“students in the public schools do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.29 “Freedom of speech and freedom of
the press, which are protected by the First Amendment are among the fundamental
personal rights.”30 This right undoubtedly protects the speech of students,31 even
while on a schools campus, however, students’ rights must be “applied in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment.”32 Striking a balance between
maintaining students rights to Free Speech and public schools’ objectives to
maintain order is a difficult task but one that can be accomplished. To determine
whether a cyber-bullying is constitutional, schools must know whether or not the
speech violates students’ rights to Free Speech. Unfortunately with regards to offcampus speech (cyber-bullying), the Supreme Court has not reached a conclusion
and, evidenced by the Second Circuit and Third Circuit split, lower courts are
divided over this very issue.33
The best-known case discussing student’s protection of Free Speech at school

28 USCA Const Amend. I
29 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
30 Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, Supreme Court of the United States. March 9, 1942315 U.S.
56862 S.Ct. 766
31Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
32Id.
33 Compare J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), (holding that
the school could not discipline a student for speech created off-campus) with Wisniewski v. Bd. of
Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the school can
regulate student speech created off-campus where it was reasonably foreseeable that it would reach
the school campus).

is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. The case, spotlighted
on the Vietnam War, involved students and parents, from Des Moines, who
ultimately decided the best way to publicize their objections to the hostilities in
Vietnam and support a truce, was to wear black armbands and fast periodically
during the holiday season, through New Years day.34 The principals of the Des
Moines schools found out about the objections to the war and quickly adopted a new
policy at Des Moines public schools, outlawing armbands being worn to school.35
The punishment for wearing an armband to school was suspension.36 Although
aware of the schools policy regarding these armbands, a number of students,
including John Tinker, wore their black armbands to school and immediately were
sent home and suspended from school.37
The court in Tinker opined that the wearing of the armbands was ‘pure
speech’ – speech that is “entitled to comprehensive protection under the First
Amendment.”38 It further stated that this ‘pure speech’ was “entirely divorced from
actually or potentially disruptive conduct” on school grounds.39 Although the newly
enacted policy of the school was broken, the students were simply expressing their
views peacefully and in no way was their expression – and therefore speech –
disruptive. They went to school, sat in classes, talked amongst friends and acted as
any orderly student would on a day-to-day basis at school. The only difference was
that they were wearing a black armband and for that they were suspended and not
34

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
35

allowed to return until the armband was removed. In no way did the armbands
disrupt school activities nor did the armbands exude un-school-like demeanor. The
court stated that this case in no way related to similar cases where schools
regulated clothing types, length of skirts or hairstyles,40 all of which were within the
schools authority to regulate.
The Supreme Court in Tinker recognized that speech while on school grounds
differed from normal run of the mill speech and that schools needed to have some
authority to regulate the speech of their students. Without such authority, schools
would get disorderly and there would be potential for complete pandemonium.
However, the court also acknowledged that this authority is not endless. Tinker shed
no light on the main issue at hand - speech that originates off-campus. The court
extended schools authority, holding that schools can regulate speech that
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others.” 41
A. ON-CAMPUS VS. OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH
Given the need for schools to have a certain amount of control over students’
speech, difficultly arises and schools are concerned over whether or not their
current or potential cyber-bullying policies violate the First Amendment and
whether or not they can regulate off-campus cyber-bullying. Schools must first

40

Id. at 507-8. See Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 392 F.2d 697 (C.A.5th Cir. 1968) and
Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538, 30 A.L.R. 1212 (1923)
41 Id. at 513

assess where the speech originated.42 It is uncontroverted that speech initiated oncampus is well within the schools authority to regulate.43 The more difficult issue is
speech initiated off-campus.
There are a number of lower court cases, which have dealt with the issue of
when public schools have jurisdiction over a student’s speech when the speech
occurs off-campus. However, there is no uniformity in the decisions, causing even
more confusion.
In determining whether or not speech originates on-campus, courts have
used two different tests. The first test some of the courts use is the “reasonably
foreseeable” test. In these instances, schools can regulate off-campus speech if it is
“a reasonably foreseeable risk that the speech would materially and substantially
disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”44 In Wisniewski, a students’ creation
and transmission of the IM icon - a small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a
person's head, above which were dots representing splattered blood45 - occurred
away from school property on his parents home computer. Though the speech at
issue in this case clearly originated off-campus, the court nevertheless concluded
that this speech was not protected because of the reasonably foreseeable risk that it
would materially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.46
The second test the courts use is the “sufficient nexus” test. Here the courts
look to see whether or not there is a sufficient nexus between the speech and the
See J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School Dist. 569 Pa. 638, 665 where the court lays down a
foundation to determine the constitutional analysis of a students freedom of speech. The court
explains that first a “location analysis” must be done followed by a “type of speech analysis.”
43 Supra Introduction
44 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007)
45 Id. at 36
46 Id. at 38
42

school. 47 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in J.S. v. Bethlehem, used this
reasoning to determine that an off-campus student created site, entitled “Teacher
Sux,” which consisted of a number of web pages that made derogatory, profane,
offensive and threatening comments, primarily about the student's algebra teacher,
contained a “sufficient nexus between the web site and the school campus to
consider the speech as occurring on-campus.”48 Coming to this conclusion, the court
opined that the speech was not a protected speech and the school had the authority
to discipline and take action against the student, as if the speech originated oncampus.
The court in Bethlehem applied a broader application of the “sufficient nexus”
test, however, there are other lower courts that have been more hesitant and have
applied a more narrow understanding of the “sufficient nexus” test.49 The court in
Evans, was reluctant to apply such a broad application of the test to a student who
created a group on Facebook called “Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I've ever
met.”50 The purpose of the group was for students to voice their opinions and
comments about a teacher.51 The posting made from the students home computer
and after school hours and did not contain threats of violence. Further, the postings
did not disrupt school activities. Although there seems to be a sufficient nexus
between the student’s speech and school, the court was unwilling to extend such a
broad application and held that this off-camps speech was protected. Therefore, the
Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Beverly Hills, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1107;
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 807 A.2d 847, 864 (2002)
48 J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 807 A.2d 847, 865 (2002)
49 Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010)
50 Id. at 1370
51 Id.
47

school had no authority to regulate and/or discipline the speech.52
Given the uncertainty of courts on how to apply the various tests, and in
what instances to apply these tests, when a school adopts a model cyber-bullying
policy, they should prudent to include both the foreseeability aspects and the
sufficient nexus application of off-campus speech.53
A1. OFF CAMPUS SPEECH – CIRCUIT SPLIT
To further complicate the issue of when off-campus speech can or cannot be
regulated by schools, the 2nd Circuit and 3rd Circuit are split over this very issue.54
J.S. v. Blue Mountain, a 3rd Circuit case was centered on a student who created from
her home computer, an Internet profile of the principal.55 The profile, on MySpace,
contained his photograph misappropriated from school district website and
profanity-laced statements insinuating that he was sex addict and pedophile.56
The 3rd Circuits decision was heavily focused on the ‘reasonable
foreseeability’ of the speech disrupting school activities. At oral arguments, the
school district specifically conceded that, “[the student’s] speech did not cause a
substantial disruption in the school.”57 Along with the concession, the court relied
on an important factor in that no student was able to access the MySpace account

Id.
53 See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (2010) where the court
used analyzed a student’s speech in terms of whether the speech was foreseeable to materially and
substantially disrupt as well as whether there was a sufficient nexus between the speech and school
activity.
54 Compare J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915(3d Cir. 2011) with Wisniewski
v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007)
55 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011)
56 Id.
57 Id. at 928
52

created from school computers, as MySpace was a blocked website.58 The court
further noted that the only printout version of the profile that was ever brought
onto the school campus as the one that was expressly requested by the principal
himself.59 Because of the forgoing facts, the court held that “the School District could
have reasonably forecasted a substantial disruption of or material interference with
the school as a result of the profile [created by the student]. Under Tinker, therefore,
the School District violated [the students] First Amendment free speech rights when
[the student] was suspended for creating the profile.”60
On the other hand, the 2nd Circuit in Wisniewski held that off campus speech
can be regulated by school officials where the speech was reasonably foreseeable to
reach the school campus.61 Wisniewski, was a case about a student using AOL instant
messenger who had an IM icon with a small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a
person's head, above which were dots representing splattered blood and beneath
the drawing appeared the words “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,”62 the students English
teacher. The student then transmitted messages to other students, who then
informed the teacher of the icon.63
The 2nd Circuit concluded that this ‘speech’ “crossed the boundary of
protected speech and constituted student conduct that posed a reasonably
foreseeable risk that the icon would come to the attention of school authorities and
that it would “materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
58

Id. at 929
Id.
60 Id. at 931
61 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007)
62 Id. at 37
63 Id.
59

school.”64 Here the court, just like the 3rd Circuit focused on the ‘reasonable
foreseeability’ of the speech reaching the school and disrupting school activities,
however the 2nd Circuit found that the speech was not protected while the 3rd Circuit
found that it was.
Given the uncertainty of the Court of Appeals, evidenced by the circuit split,
this issue is ripe for the Supreme Court to hear. Given the nature of the speech in
both Blue Mountain and Wisniewski, the Court should likely hold that speech of this
caliber, which is aimed at a school official and contains vulgar and offensive
material, is not protected speech. Although both of the circuits used the same
reasoning to come to opposite conclusions, the 3rd Circuit likely erred in holding that
the creation of the MySpace profile was not protected speech. Just as in Wisniewski,
where the 2nd Circuit found that a students IM icon, which if had not been brought to
the teachers attention would have never been known, was found to be unprotected
and therefore speech the school could regulate, so too the profile which contained
vulgar and rude comments about a schools principal is reasonably foreseeable to
disrupt the school. The Supreme Court will likely hold that any speech aimed at
teachers or administrators of schools which contain lewd, vulgar and indecent
comments or depictions about those individuals is speech that is reasonably
foreseeable to reach school grounds and therefore, even though the speech
originated off campus, is speech that schools may regulate.
B. PROTECTED VS. UNPROTECTED SPEECH
Once the school has determined where the speech originated, there is yet
64

Id. at 38-9

another question schools must ask, and yet another substantive matter that is
essential for schools to include in their model cyber-bullying policies – what type of
speech has occurred? Although this may seem obscure, the courts are again split as
to what type of speech can be regulated. As Tinker so perfectly stated, students do
not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”65 However, there are certain types of speech, which students are
not protected under their First Amendment rights.
The first category of unprotected speech is “true threats.”66 For example, a
student that creates a Facebook page entitled “Kill Professor Smith,” would be
considered a true threat to that teacher, and this type of speech is not protected
under the First Amendment. The court in Lovell explained “school officials are
justified in taking very seriously student threats against faculty or other students.”67
Given the high risk of certain threats against teachers and other student, serious and
true threats are not protected speech and a model cyber-bullying policy need not
clearly explain what a true threat is. A ‘true threat’ is easily spotted and a school will
“know it when they see it.”68
Although this category of speech seems pretty cut and dry, there are cases,
such as one recently decided in a California state appeals court, which apply a
deeper analysis to true threats. In May 2011 a juvenile confronted his teacher after

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) ; see also Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494
F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007)
67 Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996)
68 Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) where Justice Stewart, concurring, explained
that he would not “attempt further to define the kinds of material [he] understood to be embraced
within [pornography], but that he ‘knows it when he sees it’.”
65
66

she sent him to the principal’s office.69 After leaving the office, he pounded on the
teacher’s door, yelling: “Let me in you mother f—— bitch. How could you do this to
me?”70 He also allegedly threatened the school principal who had spoken to him
about his behavior in class. He allegedly left the official’s office and said, “I’m going
to f— them up.”71 For this conduct, the student was charged with violating California
Penal Code 71, which states:
Every person who, with intent to cause, attempts to cause, or causes,
any officer or employee of any public or private educational
institution or any public officer or employee to do, or refrain from
doing, any act in the performance of his duties, by means of a threat …
is guilty of a public offense.72
The appeals court focused on the context of the incident and noted that the
student pounded on the teacher’s door for two minutes, yelled at the teacher,
displayed angry facial expressions and intimidating body language.73 The court
concluded his “physically aggressive behavior and belligerent statements in
combination more than sufficiently established”74 that he uttered a true threat.75
The court also said a true threat was spoken to the principal when the student
69

Speech Analysis, In true threat cases, context matters, available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/in-true-threat-cases-context-matters (Last visited, Jan 2,
2012)
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 71
73 Speech Analysis, In true threat cases, context matters, available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/in-true-threat-cases-context-matters (Last visited, Jan 2,
2012)
74 2012 WL 5938072, Cal.App. 1 Dist., Nov. 28 , 2012
75 Speech Analysis, In true threat cases, context matters, available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/in-true-threat-cases-context-matters (Last visited, Jan 2,
2012)

“ignored her efforts to block his progress toward the classrooms, and his aggressive
conduct – in the classrooms themselves – directly interfered with [the principals]
performance of her duties and implicitly threatened continued interference if she
persisted in the performance of her disciplinary duties.”76
This decision of the California appeals court shows that a true-threat analysis
must be analyzed within its context. What is considered a true threat in one case can
certainly be considered protected speech in another. This in turn raises the issue of
the extent a true threat is really a true threat and at what points teachers are truly
threatened by students’ expressions and speech. Although there is no clear cut line
of what constitutes true-threats, as this California cases implies, the analysis is a
tricky one and one that must always be put in context.
The second category of speech is speech that bears the connection to a
school.77 The Supreme Courts decision in Hazelwood shed light on the issue of when
speech that bears a connection to the school can or cannot be regulated by the
school. The court in Hazelwood was faced with a situation where the principal
excised two pages of a student newspaper containing articles on teen pregnancy and
the impact of divorce on students at the school.78 The paper was produced by the
school and funded by the school, although the student contributors and editors
wrote articles as part of a journalism class.79 As part of the schools policy, the
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teacher of the journalism class submitted all articles to the principal for approval.80
The principal objected to the two articles, one on teen pregnancy and one on
divorce. His reasons, as explained by the court, were that “the pregnant students,
although not named, might be identified from the text, and because he believed that
the article's references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for
some of the younger students,”81 and the divorce article mentioned a student by
name who had complained of her father’s conduct and he believed that “the
student's parents should have been given an opportunity to respond to the remarks
or to consent to their publication.”82 The principal felt that there was no time to
make the necessary changes before the paper went to press and therefore made the
ultimate decision to excise those two articles.83
The court concluded that the school was intended as a supervised learning
experience for journalism students and therefore the school had authority to excise
the pages they felt were not “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”84 Therefore, any speech that in some way is connected to the school,
whether it is speech in a school sponsored newspaper disseminated to the students
or speech, which occurred at an off-campus school function, the school has the right
and authority to regulate and condemn the speech. The court also noted that school
officials did not deviate from their normal practices and policies and therefore the
school was able to regulate the contents of the newspaper in any reasonable
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manner.85
A more recent decision, Fleming, from the Tenth Circuit, citing Hazelwood,
stated that “[speech which] students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the ‘imprimatur of the school’ constitute schoolsponsored speech, over which the school may exercise control, so long as its actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns [of the school].” 86
Fleming, a post-Columbine school shooting case, was centered on a project
organized by two teachers in which students and anyone affiliated with the school
were given the option of painting tiles to be hung in the school as a way to
reconstruct and become comfortable with the school post-shooting.87 Monies for the
project were raised privately and were to be used by the two supervising teachers at
their own discretion, although the area administrator gave strict guidelines of what
could and could not be painted onto the tiles.88
The project was then expanded beyond students to include first responders,
community members, parents etc. and they were not given written copies of the
guidelines.89 These new members of the tile painting project wishes to paint certain
things - he names of their children and religious symbols90- but were informed that
these symbols were outside the guidelines. Only later were the strict guidelines
relaxed and the painters were then allowed put their children’s names or dates on
the tiles, but were still not allowed to place religious symbols or anything obscene
85
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or offensive on the tiles.91 Suit was brought alleging that students and other
participants in the tile painting’s free speech had been violated.92
The court in Fleming noted that the Hazelwood decision did “not give schools
unbridled discretion over school-sponsored speech.”93 The court explained that
speech, which bears the imprimatur of the school, is broad and not restricted to
speech or activities conducted as part of the school curriculum.94 In terms of the
imprimatur of the school, the court reasoned that the tiles were to become a lasting
part of the school and therefore schools officials had the authority to regulate what
was painted on the tiles.95 As well, the purpose of reacquainting the students with
the school and participating in community healing falls under the broad umbrella of
schools pedagogical purposes.96
It is evident from this line of cases that speech connected to a school,
reasonably related to school activity, or related to school curriculum is not
protected speech. For these reasons, school officials have the right to control and
regulate these types of speeches First Amendment rights are not at issue.
The last type of speech that can be regulated is a more extensive type of
speech. This type of speech was brought down under what is known as the “Tinker
standard.” The Court in Tinker set out a two-part test to determine when schools can
regulate student speech. This two-part test reads as follows:
91
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Conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior that materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.97
B1. MATERIALLY DISRUPTIVE SPEECH
Most courts that use the Tinker test in determining whether a speech is
protected or not, apply the first prong – materially disruptive speech – more readily
and conduct their analysis as such. However, the application of the first prong, as
discussed below, has led to many different outcomes.
Comparing Layshock ex rel. Layschock v. Hermitage School District with J.S. ex
rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. District, we see the evidence of the uneven outcomes
of applying the “materially disruptive” prong of Tinker. Both of these cases involved
a student a school creating a faux profile of an administrator at their respective
schools on MySpace. The court in Layshock held that the school district did not have
authority to punish student for expressive conduct outside of school that district
considered lewd and offensive.98 On the other hand, the court in Bethlehem came to
the opposite conclusion holding that speech expressed by student on MySpace, was
“on-campus” speech that implicated unique First Amendment concerns regarding
the school environment and given the website's disruption of the entire school
community, expelling the student did not violate his First Amendment rights.99
These are just two examples of cases that have out with different conclusions are
very similar sets of facts, showing that the application of the first prong of the
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
Layshock ex rel. Layschock v. Hermitage School Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3rd Cir. 2011)
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97
98

Tinker test is no easy task.
There is also the additional problem of what “materially disruptive” means
and how far the reach of “materially disruptive” will run. As we see in the case of
Doninger v. Niehoff, where teachers and administrators were called away from
school activities and meetings to respond to and deal with a student’s blog post,100
the court held a materially disruptive speech occurred because the administrators
were forced to interrupt their regular activities to respond to the problem. However,
the court was hesitant to find a materially disruptive speech where an administrator
was not disrupted from her regular activities when dealing with the consequences
of a student video posting on YouTube.101 It is clear from the line of cases that the
speech must be a real disturbance and not some minor inconvenience for
administrators to deal with.102
Needless to say, a cyber-bullying policy at a school should include provisions
stating that a student’s First Amendment rights do not protect materially disruptive
speech, whether it is on-campus or off-campus speech.
B2. SUBSTANTIAL DISORDER OR INVASION OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
Courts have been reluctant to find a speech outside the realm of speech
protected by the First Amendment by finding it violates the second prong of the
Tinker test – speech that “impinges upon the rights of other students.”103 Though
the courts have yet to seriously apply the second prong it is not something, which
should not be thrown to the wayside. Thus, speech that violates or impinges upon
100Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008)
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students right is a speech, which is not protected and schools would have the
authority to regulate that speech.
C. SUMMATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES IN RELATION TO CYBERBULLYING
Schools adopting a model cyber-bullying policy must take into account First
Amendment issues. Schools must assess where the speech occurred – on-campus or
off-campus. On campus speech is undoubtedly within the rights of teachers and
administrators to take action. The trickier question is that of off-campus speech. If
the off-campus speech occurs at a school function, the school can regulate. Offcampus speech which either poses a ‘true threat,’ is materially disruptive to school
discipline, or impinges upon other student’s rights, can be regulated by school
educators.
These last three examples of speech are especially important in the world of
cyber-bullying. Cyber-bullying more often that not occurs outside of the school
campus, yet has a detrimental impact of students and teachers who are the victims.
Many times the speech caused by the cyber-bully negatively impacts classroom
activity and this is why schools are well within their rights to control these
categories of speech. To truly combat the problem and avoid all constitutional
issues, model cyber-bullying policies must include all aspects of the First
Amendment analysis posed above. In this way the policy will be protected from First
Amendment claims brought by students and administrators will know WHEN they
are within their rights to take action against cyber-bullies.
III. DUE PROCESS ISSUES

Due process requires a cyber-bullying policy to address two issues. A policy
must give students and parents proper notice of the policy and secondly, a policy
may be challenged as being too vague, as seen in the Layshock case.104
A. NON-VAGUE
The first to adopting a model cyber-bullying policy, which is not vague, is to
have a strong definition. 105 The definition will notify school administrators,
students, and teachers exactly what is unacceptable. The definition should not be
overbroad, or vague – it must not punish constitutionally protected speech.106
The key to a adopting a strong definition is to make sure each and every term
is defined. Many courts have struck down policies or certain provisions of policies
for lack of or lack of a clear definition.107 A model definition of cyber-bullying should
read as follows:
“Electronic communication" or “cyber-bullying” means any communication
through an electronic device including but not limited to a telephone, cellular phone,
computer or pager, which communication includes but is not limited to E-Mail,
instant messaging, text messages, blogs, mobile phones, pagers, online games, and
Web sites intended to:
(i)

Physically harm a student or damages the student's property; or

(ii)

Substantially interfere with a student's educational opportunities; or
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(iii)

(Be so severe, persistent, or pervasive that it creates an intimidating
or threatening educational environment; or

(iv)

Substantially disrupt the orderly operation of the school.108

This model language contains a clear and concise definition of cyber-bullying
and also contains the provisions associated with the First Amendment analysis.109
B. NOTICE
A cyber-bullying policy must also give parents and student notice of the
policy. The details of the policy must be accurately conveyed to the students and
parents in advance, so that they receive actual notice of the policy. To ensure proper
notice the policy should ne publicized in the school conduct code.110 “The notice
will send a message to students, teachers and parents that the school is taking this
issue seriously and does not accept inappropriate conduct. The notice will also
serve to instruct students, parents, and school staff how to identify, respond to and
report incidents of bullying.”111
Another safety mechanism to ensure parents and students receive notice is
that the school should require a signed confirmation of receipt and understanding
letter from both students and parents, stating their awareness of the effective policy.
Combining these two effective means for giving notice, a schools policy will not be
challenged under any Due Process issues.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Given the viral nature and threat of cyber-bullying, schools must adopt
policies, which combat the problem at its heart. For years, teachers, administrators
and all educators have been in the dark as how to respond and discipline those
students who have been abusing others via cyber-bullying. Were they allowed to do
anything? The student posted something to the computer from their home. Is that
within their confines to control?
The analysis above and the steps laid out for what should be included within
a cyber-bullying policy, teachers and educators will no longer feel that they have no
where to turn or there is nothing that they can do. A model cyber-bullying policy
should be comprehensive and inclusive. The policy should cover all aspects of
potential First Amendment challenges as well as Due Process challenges. By
adopting such a policy schools will be able to halt cyber-bullying in their own
schools which will lead to less students dreading coming to school and better and
safer environment for our children to learn in.
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